1 00:00:03,310 --> 00:00:06,053 February the 12th, 2009. 2 00:00:07,360 --> 00:00:09,383 Just outside Buffalo, New York. 3 00:00:15,710 --> 00:00:16,543 Gear down. 4 00:00:17,740 --> 00:00:18,869 Looks alive. 5 00:00:18,870 --> 00:00:19,863 Gear's down. 6 00:00:24,915 --> 00:00:26,032 Jesus Christ! 7 00:00:29,451 --> 00:00:31,347 The airplane entered an aerodynamic stall. 8 00:00:33,570 --> 00:00:34,520 It did not recover. 9 00:00:42,323 --> 00:00:44,949 It was one of the grizzliest, nastiest scenes 10 00:00:44,950 --> 00:00:46,100 that I think I've seen. 11 00:00:46,960 --> 00:00:48,699 The crash of Continental Connection 12 00:00:48,700 --> 00:00:52,009 Flight 3407 would be one of the NTSB's 13 00:00:52,010 --> 00:00:54,109 most important in decades, 14 00:00:54,110 --> 00:00:55,769 and would see a grieving father 15 00:00:55,770 --> 00:00:58,859 fight for changes to the laws governing small airlines. 16 00:00:58,860 --> 00:01:01,399 I'm focused and determined to change what exists, 17 00:01:01,400 --> 00:01:03,300 and not have another dad sitting here. 18 00:01:06,625 --> 00:01:08,708 Mayday, mayday. 19 00:01:35,150 --> 00:01:38,279 Continental Connection Flight 3407 20 00:01:38,280 --> 00:01:40,729 operated by Colgan Air, is en route 21 00:01:40,730 --> 00:01:43,273 from Newark, New Jersey to Buffalo, New York. 22 00:01:46,940 --> 00:01:50,169 It's been a busy flight for Captain Marvin Renslow. 23 00:01:50,170 --> 00:01:52,859 He's providing guidance to a new first officer, 24 00:01:52,860 --> 00:01:56,809 Rebecca Shaw, a former flight instructor from Seattle. 25 00:01:59,270 --> 00:02:00,102 Bless you. 26 00:02:00,103 --> 00:02:01,349 Shaw's only been with the airline 27 00:02:01,350 --> 00:02:03,639 for just over a year. 28 00:02:03,640 --> 00:02:06,290 She must decide if she now wants to become a captain. 29 00:02:07,590 --> 00:02:10,609 I don't know what I want to do with the upgrade. 30 00:02:10,610 --> 00:02:12,209 It depends where I'm based. 31 00:02:12,210 --> 00:02:14,169 Well, think of it this way. 32 00:02:14,170 --> 00:02:16,239 If you stayed on the queue, obviously you're not 33 00:02:16,240 --> 00:02:17,859 making the captain rank. 34 00:02:17,860 --> 00:02:18,692 Right. 35 00:02:18,693 --> 00:02:19,959 But you may have a better quality of life 36 00:02:19,960 --> 00:02:22,339 with regards to buying a house, having a schedule-- 37 00:02:22,340 --> 00:02:24,179 Shaw trained to be a first officer 38 00:02:24,180 --> 00:02:25,883 on the plane they're flying now, 39 00:02:27,110 --> 00:02:29,833 a Canadian-made Bombardier Q400. 40 00:02:31,260 --> 00:02:33,019 It's a twin engine turboprop, 41 00:02:33,020 --> 00:02:34,793 popular with regional airlines. 42 00:02:37,920 --> 00:02:40,503 The 45 passengers have had a long night. 43 00:02:43,364 --> 00:02:46,559 Their plane was held up for two hours at Newark, 44 00:02:46,560 --> 00:02:49,163 a delay considerably longer than their journey. 45 00:02:51,410 --> 00:02:55,613 Flight 3407 is heading northwest over upstate New York. 46 00:02:57,220 --> 00:02:59,153 The trip is only 53 minutes. 47 00:03:02,540 --> 00:03:05,859 Visibility is poor, and there's a forecast of snow 48 00:03:05,860 --> 00:03:07,463 and moderate winds in Buffalo. 49 00:03:12,840 --> 00:03:14,720 Just some water, please. 50 00:03:14,721 --> 00:03:17,439 Ellyce Kausner is a student at Florida Coastal 51 00:03:17,440 --> 00:03:19,093 School of Law in Jacksonville. 52 00:03:22,760 --> 00:03:26,109 She's on her way to visit her family in Buffalo. 53 00:03:26,110 --> 00:03:28,169 She had five nieces and nephew at the time, 54 00:03:28,170 --> 00:03:31,409 and they had a love luncheon at the kids' school, 55 00:03:31,410 --> 00:03:33,859 a couple of the nephews, and they both wanted Aunt Elly 56 00:03:33,860 --> 00:03:35,363 to be their guest. 57 00:03:36,350 --> 00:03:39,159 Any excuse to come home, and she came home. 58 00:03:39,160 --> 00:03:40,969 She talked to all of us from Newark. 59 00:03:40,970 --> 00:03:41,802 Hey. 60 00:03:41,803 --> 00:03:42,979 She called us from the lounge. 61 00:03:42,980 --> 00:03:44,829 Yeah, it's been over two hours. 62 00:03:44,830 --> 00:03:47,253 She was p.o.'d because of the delay. 63 00:03:50,720 --> 00:03:54,089 Folks from the flight deck, your first officer speaking. 64 00:03:54,090 --> 00:03:57,729 It looks like at this time we're about 10, maybe 15 65 00:03:57,730 --> 00:03:59,849 minutes outside of Buffalo. 66 00:03:59,850 --> 00:04:01,683 Weather in Buffalo is pretty foggy. 67 00:04:02,750 --> 00:04:04,925 Snowing a little bit there. 68 00:04:04,926 --> 00:04:05,989 I'd like to make sure everyone remains 69 00:04:05,990 --> 00:04:07,409 in their seats so the flight attendants 70 00:04:07,410 --> 00:04:09,309 can prepare the cabin for arrival. 71 00:04:09,310 --> 00:04:10,143 Thank you. 72 00:04:12,322 --> 00:04:16,173 Colgan 3407, descend and maintain, 2300. 73 00:04:17,060 --> 00:04:19,579 Okay, down to 2300. 74 00:04:19,580 --> 00:04:20,823 Colgan 3407. 75 00:04:23,630 --> 00:04:25,580 Let's do a descend checklist, please. 76 00:04:26,580 --> 00:04:28,839 We can do the approach checklist along with it. 77 00:04:28,840 --> 00:04:30,059 Sure. 78 00:04:30,060 --> 00:04:31,599 Bug set. 79 00:04:31,600 --> 00:04:32,433 Set. 80 00:04:33,370 --> 00:04:37,489 GPWS landing flap selected, 15 degrees. 81 00:04:37,490 --> 00:04:39,389 The pilots go through a list of settings 82 00:04:39,390 --> 00:04:41,836 for the plane to continue its landing approach. 83 00:04:41,837 --> 00:04:43,187 Lights are off. 84 00:04:43,188 --> 00:04:44,021 Yup. 85 00:04:45,768 --> 00:04:47,569 Passengers can already glimpse the lights 86 00:04:47,570 --> 00:04:48,620 of Buffalo's suburbs. 87 00:04:51,090 --> 00:04:53,279 Clarence Center is on the approach path 88 00:04:53,280 --> 00:04:55,493 for aircraft landing at Buffalo's airport. 89 00:05:08,640 --> 00:05:09,473 Gear down. 90 00:05:11,310 --> 00:05:13,403 Looks alive. - Gear's down. 91 00:05:14,873 --> 00:05:15,705 All right. 92 00:05:15,706 --> 00:05:16,589 Flaps 15? 93 00:05:16,590 --> 00:05:19,419 Extending the flaps provides more lift, 94 00:05:19,420 --> 00:05:22,170 allowing the plane to slow to its final approach scene. 95 00:05:24,734 --> 00:05:25,567 Uh ... 96 00:05:28,360 --> 00:05:29,619 Jesus Christ! 97 00:05:29,620 --> 00:05:32,470 Suddenly, the control column start to shake. 98 00:05:35,870 --> 00:05:38,193 The Q400 is slipping out of control. 99 00:05:43,400 --> 00:05:46,961 Captain Renslow struggles to keep his plane flying. 100 00:05:50,330 --> 00:05:52,280 But it seems to have a mind of its own. 101 00:06:09,446 --> 00:06:10,279 The gear! 102 00:06:15,238 --> 00:06:17,156 Should the gear be up? 103 00:06:17,157 --> 00:06:17,990 Gear up! 104 00:06:19,855 --> 00:06:20,688 Oh, damn! 105 00:06:25,581 --> 00:06:26,831 Oh, we're down. 106 00:06:36,840 --> 00:06:38,689 The plane crashes into a house 107 00:06:38,690 --> 00:06:40,784 at 6038, Long Street. 108 00:06:47,578 --> 00:06:49,509 At air traffic control in Buffalo, 109 00:06:49,510 --> 00:06:52,593 Flight 3407 disappears from radar. 110 00:06:55,230 --> 00:06:56,062 Check Colgan Air. 111 00:06:56,063 --> 00:06:57,189 See if he's on yet. 112 00:06:57,190 --> 00:06:58,499 What's his call sign? 113 00:06:58,500 --> 00:07:00,253 Colgan, 3407. 114 00:07:01,300 --> 00:07:02,809 Nope, I don't have him. 115 00:07:02,810 --> 00:07:04,628 Do you see anything out there? 116 00:07:04,629 --> 00:07:05,962 Nothing. 117 00:07:08,110 --> 00:07:08,943 All right. 118 00:07:09,860 --> 00:07:11,369 Call the fire department. 119 00:07:11,370 --> 00:07:13,899 I will never forget the dispatcher's words. 120 00:07:13,900 --> 00:07:15,639 Plane crash, house on fire. 121 00:07:15,640 --> 00:07:19,929 I immediately got my shoes on and my coat on. 122 00:07:19,930 --> 00:07:24,065 Got in my truck, and started heading down the driveway. 123 00:07:25,150 --> 00:07:27,739 Firefighters don't have far to go. 124 00:07:27,740 --> 00:07:31,219 6038 Long Street, home of the Wielinski family, 125 00:07:31,220 --> 00:07:33,983 is less than a block from the Clarence Center station. 126 00:07:34,870 --> 00:07:36,570 As I turned towards the village, 127 00:07:37,610 --> 00:07:39,739 the whole village was aglow. 128 00:07:39,740 --> 00:07:42,333 You could see the smoke, you could see the flame. 129 00:07:43,630 --> 00:07:45,409 Karen Wielinski and her daughter 130 00:07:45,410 --> 00:07:47,699 make it out of their house alive, 131 00:07:47,700 --> 00:07:49,583 but her husband, Douglas, is killed. 132 00:07:51,970 --> 00:07:55,569 My initial reaction was there was no way 133 00:07:55,570 --> 00:07:57,459 that somebody made it out, 134 00:07:57,460 --> 00:08:01,506 but the EMS division reported that they had two people, 135 00:08:01,507 --> 00:08:03,309 and they were taking them to the hospital. 136 00:08:03,310 --> 00:08:05,509 And I said well, which firefighters are they? 137 00:08:05,510 --> 00:08:07,109 And they said they're not firefighters, chief. 138 00:08:07,110 --> 00:08:09,079 They're survivors from the house. 139 00:08:09,080 --> 00:08:11,079 I actually physically had to go to the ambulance 140 00:08:11,080 --> 00:08:14,409 and look inside for myself to believe. 141 00:08:14,410 --> 00:08:17,410 Firefighters have never seen a blaze like this. 142 00:08:18,990 --> 00:08:23,209 If you've ever gone to a bonfire and stood five feet 143 00:08:23,210 --> 00:08:26,089 from it and you couldn't take it anymore, 144 00:08:26,090 --> 00:08:28,290 that's what it felt like from 100 feet away. 145 00:08:30,350 --> 00:08:33,109 The height of it was just unbelievable, 146 00:08:33,110 --> 00:08:35,277 obviously because of the fuel that was probably added to it 147 00:08:35,278 --> 00:08:39,791 and the debris area was very large. 148 00:08:39,792 --> 00:08:43,053 It was a very, very horrific sight. 149 00:08:44,270 --> 00:08:45,589 We live in town, when the plane went down 150 00:08:45,590 --> 00:08:47,779 right down the road, my son was driving home 151 00:08:47,780 --> 00:08:52,089 from a soccer game, and went right by the plane crash 152 00:08:52,090 --> 00:08:54,719 and called me up, and said there's a plane down on Clarence. 153 00:08:54,720 --> 00:08:58,439 Never really entered our brain that it was Elly's plane. 154 00:08:58,440 --> 00:09:02,129 Flight 3407 has crashed eight kilometers short 155 00:09:02,130 --> 00:09:04,179 of Buffalo airport. 156 00:09:04,180 --> 00:09:07,569 All 49 passengers and crew are dead, 157 00:09:07,570 --> 00:09:10,049 including Captain Marvin Renslow, 158 00:09:10,050 --> 00:09:11,673 and first officer Rebecca Shaw. 159 00:09:15,170 --> 00:09:18,069 But many more people could easily have been killed. 160 00:09:18,070 --> 00:09:21,299 When you picture a house, and to see a plane 161 00:09:21,300 --> 00:09:24,839 on top of this house, no more house left, no more plane, 162 00:09:24,840 --> 00:09:27,750 only the tail section, you're asking yourself 163 00:09:28,670 --> 00:09:31,649 how in god's creation did this happen, 164 00:09:31,650 --> 00:09:34,953 and not wipe the whole block out? 165 00:09:36,250 --> 00:09:37,889 The next call was again from my son, 166 00:09:37,890 --> 00:09:39,169 said in fact it was Elly's plane. 167 00:09:39,170 --> 00:09:41,253 And he said Dad, there's no survivors. 168 00:09:44,240 --> 00:09:46,419 At which point, my wife shrieked, 169 00:09:46,420 --> 00:09:47,620 and just hit the ground. 170 00:09:49,170 --> 00:09:50,409 Chris said he had never heard his mother 171 00:09:50,410 --> 00:09:53,399 make a sound like that, and I hope he never does again. 172 00:09:53,400 --> 00:09:56,239 So that's when I knew that she was gone, 173 00:09:56,240 --> 00:09:58,962 and that was probably within 45 minutes of the accident. 174 00:10:10,240 --> 00:10:11,589 The scene in the morning 175 00:10:11,590 --> 00:10:13,303 is one of utter devastation. 176 00:10:17,280 --> 00:10:19,449 Clint Crookshanks from the NTSB. 177 00:10:19,450 --> 00:10:20,729 Can I start poking around? 178 00:10:20,730 --> 00:10:22,102 Clint Crookshanks is one of the first 179 00:10:22,103 --> 00:10:24,113 investigators on the case. 180 00:10:25,200 --> 00:10:28,019 When we arrived on scene, there was a fire still burning. 181 00:10:28,020 --> 00:10:29,899 Turns out it was from a gas line 182 00:10:29,900 --> 00:10:31,659 that had been broken in the house, 183 00:10:31,660 --> 00:10:33,539 that the firemen would put the fire out, 184 00:10:33,540 --> 00:10:35,840 and it would reignite every couple of minutes. 185 00:10:37,388 --> 00:10:40,009 It was one of the grizzliest, nastiest scenes 186 00:10:40,010 --> 00:10:41,160 that I think I've seen. 187 00:10:44,160 --> 00:10:47,849 Flight 3407 may have been a small plane, 188 00:10:47,850 --> 00:10:52,029 but it's the worst crash in the US in more than seven years. 189 00:10:52,030 --> 00:10:53,919 It will become one of the NTSB's 190 00:10:53,920 --> 00:10:56,233 most important investigations. 191 00:11:04,860 --> 00:11:08,069 The fire at the crash site of Flight 3407 192 00:11:08,070 --> 00:11:10,739 continues to burn, preventing investigators 193 00:11:10,740 --> 00:11:12,223 from examining the wreckage. 194 00:11:22,820 --> 00:11:24,739 The airplane had crashed into a house, 195 00:11:24,740 --> 00:11:26,169 and then it had burned all night long, 196 00:11:26,170 --> 00:11:29,439 so all the debris was basically in the house. 197 00:11:29,440 --> 00:11:31,689 Our concern was that we're losing evidence. 198 00:11:31,690 --> 00:11:34,089 It's perishable, and if we can't get in there 199 00:11:34,090 --> 00:11:35,949 and get the fire out, then we're not able 200 00:11:35,950 --> 00:11:39,829 to maybe get a hold of evidence that might help us 201 00:11:39,830 --> 00:11:41,299 during the investigation. 202 00:11:41,300 --> 00:11:43,159 Clint Crookshanks urgently needs 203 00:11:43,160 --> 00:11:45,709 to recover the black box flight recordings, 204 00:11:45,710 --> 00:11:49,269 which could contain valuable clues about the accident. 205 00:11:49,270 --> 00:11:51,759 We knew that the recorders were in the tail part 206 00:11:51,760 --> 00:11:53,119 of the airplane. 207 00:11:53,120 --> 00:11:55,169 Ordinarily, investigators don't go near 208 00:11:55,170 --> 00:11:56,943 a crash site that's still burning, 209 00:11:58,270 --> 00:12:00,889 but if the black boxes can't be rescued, 210 00:12:00,890 --> 00:12:04,733 they may never find out what brought down Flight 3407. 211 00:12:05,690 --> 00:12:08,379 We started looking around, and poking around 212 00:12:08,380 --> 00:12:11,280 into the wreckage, and actually found out where they were. 213 00:12:13,349 --> 00:12:14,181 Okay, whoa. 214 00:12:14,182 --> 00:12:16,319 It's probably in here, okay? 215 00:12:16,320 --> 00:12:18,009 The access panel is on the other side 216 00:12:18,010 --> 00:12:20,569 so we're gonna have to cut a hole right there. 217 00:12:20,570 --> 00:12:21,402 Okay? 218 00:12:21,403 --> 00:12:23,599 The fire department produced a chop saw. 219 00:12:23,600 --> 00:12:26,350 We were able to cut a hole in the side of the fuselage, 220 00:12:27,620 --> 00:12:30,170 and go in and grab the recorders and pull them out. 221 00:12:32,492 --> 00:12:34,227 All right, that should do it. 222 00:12:36,050 --> 00:12:37,989 To the immense relief of all, 223 00:12:37,990 --> 00:12:39,813 the recorders are undamaged. 224 00:12:41,570 --> 00:12:43,739 Once we took the recorders out of the airplane, 225 00:12:43,740 --> 00:12:45,369 we put them on the jet, and they were flown 226 00:12:45,370 --> 00:12:47,470 back to Washington DC to our headquarters. 227 00:12:51,260 --> 00:12:54,210 Now investigators are faced with a new hurdle. 228 00:12:55,300 --> 00:12:56,989 What little is left of the aircraft 229 00:12:56,990 --> 00:13:00,119 is hopelessly jumbled together with human remains, 230 00:13:00,120 --> 00:13:02,409 and debris from the house. 231 00:13:02,410 --> 00:13:04,379 It all burned and settled into the basement, 232 00:13:04,380 --> 00:13:06,859 so we had probably ten feet of debris 233 00:13:06,860 --> 00:13:09,209 that we had to dig through in order to recover 234 00:13:09,210 --> 00:13:10,693 all of the airplane. 235 00:13:12,710 --> 00:13:14,649 Authorities wonder how they can salvage 236 00:13:14,650 --> 00:13:16,993 any useful evidence from this chaos. 237 00:13:20,520 --> 00:13:23,713 They get invaluable assistance from an unusual source. 238 00:13:24,710 --> 00:13:27,739 A group of students learning to process crime scenes 239 00:13:27,740 --> 00:13:29,929 is enlisted to separate human remains 240 00:13:29,930 --> 00:13:31,333 from the rest of the debris. 241 00:13:34,080 --> 00:13:36,389 They were graduate students from a local college, 242 00:13:36,390 --> 00:13:38,299 forensic anthropology students, 243 00:13:38,300 --> 00:13:40,359 and this was good experience for them to come dig through 244 00:13:40,360 --> 00:13:43,298 wreckage like this, and look for human remains. 245 00:13:43,299 --> 00:13:44,949 The landing gear over there, please. 246 00:13:44,950 --> 00:13:47,249 It's dirty, painstaking work, 247 00:13:47,250 --> 00:13:49,439 but it frees up investigators to concentrate 248 00:13:49,440 --> 00:13:50,963 on the aircraft ruins. 249 00:13:52,120 --> 00:13:53,679 We were all on our hands and knees 250 00:13:53,680 --> 00:13:55,619 with brooms, with little shovels, 251 00:13:55,620 --> 00:13:59,759 scooping out debris, identifying it as to house debris, 252 00:13:59,760 --> 00:14:02,710 or airplane debris, and then putting it in different piles. 253 00:14:05,760 --> 00:14:08,599 The first question for me as a structures engineer 254 00:14:08,600 --> 00:14:10,109 is to figure out if the whole airplane 255 00:14:10,110 --> 00:14:11,810 made it to the scene of the crash. 256 00:14:12,800 --> 00:14:15,319 The wreckage is carefully studied. 257 00:14:15,320 --> 00:14:17,789 To determine if the plane's four corners, 258 00:14:17,790 --> 00:14:21,523 nose, tail, and both wingtips, are present. 259 00:14:25,970 --> 00:14:28,009 If we find all four corners of the airplane, 260 00:14:28,010 --> 00:14:30,839 then we know that there's no inflight breakup, 261 00:14:30,840 --> 00:14:32,499 there was nothing that departed the airplane 262 00:14:32,500 --> 00:14:35,869 during the flight that may have caused the accident. 263 00:14:35,870 --> 00:14:38,909 One wing has been consumed by fire. 264 00:14:38,910 --> 00:14:40,789 The other is shattered into pieces. 265 00:14:40,790 --> 00:14:42,516 Hey, have a look at this. 266 00:14:42,517 --> 00:14:44,639 But investigators are gradually finding 267 00:14:44,640 --> 00:14:46,518 what they'd been searching for. 268 00:14:46,519 --> 00:14:47,351 Oh yeah. 269 00:14:47,352 --> 00:14:48,185 It's the last piece. 270 00:14:49,249 --> 00:14:51,629 It wasn't until several days into the investigation 271 00:14:51,630 --> 00:14:53,769 as we were scraping away some of the debris 272 00:14:53,770 --> 00:14:55,399 that we actually found evidence 273 00:14:55,400 --> 00:14:57,043 of the left wing and the nose. 274 00:14:58,200 --> 00:15:00,209 Investigators now have all the pieces 275 00:15:00,210 --> 00:15:02,699 they need to conclude that the entire plane 276 00:15:02,700 --> 00:15:04,123 is at the crash site. 277 00:15:05,200 --> 00:15:07,749 Whatever caused the disaster was not the result 278 00:15:07,750 --> 00:15:09,595 of a breakup inflight. 279 00:15:17,000 --> 00:15:21,079 The tragedy of Flight 3407 is under intense scrutiny 280 00:15:21,080 --> 00:15:23,719 at the NTSB offices in Washington. 281 00:15:23,720 --> 00:15:25,419 Officials there try to determine 282 00:15:25,420 --> 00:15:27,923 if some kind of malfunction caused the crash. 283 00:15:29,240 --> 00:15:30,869 On this particular accident, we knew it was 284 00:15:30,870 --> 00:15:33,369 a landing accident, so if we wanted to check 285 00:15:33,370 --> 00:15:36,239 the aircraft's performance, and then also we check 286 00:15:36,240 --> 00:15:38,169 for flight control continuity. 287 00:15:38,170 --> 00:15:40,029 Much of this responsibility falls 288 00:15:40,030 --> 00:15:41,203 to Scott Warren. 289 00:15:42,140 --> 00:15:44,059 My role in the investigation was to be 290 00:15:44,060 --> 00:15:46,769 the systems group chairman for the safety board, 291 00:15:46,770 --> 00:15:48,299 so I was in charge of looking 292 00:15:48,300 --> 00:15:51,719 at all of the aircraft systems. 293 00:15:51,720 --> 00:15:53,429 Warren analyzes the aircraft's 294 00:15:53,430 --> 00:15:56,659 cockpit voice recorder, or CVR, to determine 295 00:15:56,660 --> 00:16:00,293 if there were any indications of a problem in the cockpit. 296 00:16:00,294 --> 00:16:01,799 Prepare the cabin for arrival. 297 00:16:01,800 --> 00:16:02,633 Thank you. 298 00:16:04,600 --> 00:16:05,973 Is that ice on the windshield? 299 00:16:06,920 --> 00:16:10,029 He discovers that six minutes before the crash, 300 00:16:10,030 --> 00:16:13,819 the crew of Flight 3407 had noticed a buildup of ice 301 00:16:13,820 --> 00:16:14,809 on the aircraft. 302 00:16:14,810 --> 00:16:16,589 Got it on my side. 303 00:16:16,590 --> 00:16:17,463 Don't have yours? 304 00:16:19,320 --> 00:16:20,243 Oh, yeah. 305 00:16:21,450 --> 00:16:22,909 Oh, it's lots of ice. 306 00:16:22,910 --> 00:16:25,710 Ice can be a deadly threat to any airplane. 307 00:16:27,720 --> 00:16:30,189 If an aircraft has ice on it, it will have more drag on it 308 00:16:30,190 --> 00:16:33,673 so it will require more power to maintain a given airspeed. 309 00:16:37,093 --> 00:16:38,279 Oh man. 310 00:16:38,280 --> 00:16:40,819 Most I've seen on the leading edges in a long time. 311 00:16:40,820 --> 00:16:42,699 Until a year ago, Rebecca Shaw 312 00:16:42,700 --> 00:16:45,383 had no experience with ice on an aircraft. 313 00:16:46,440 --> 00:16:48,140 I'd never seen icing conditions. 314 00:16:49,319 --> 00:16:50,489 I've never deiced. 315 00:16:50,490 --> 00:16:51,990 Never experienced any of that. 316 00:16:53,080 --> 00:16:55,559 When ice creates on a wing, 317 00:16:55,560 --> 00:16:56,989 it adds weight to the airplane, 318 00:16:56,990 --> 00:17:00,299 but most importantly, it changes the shape of the wing, 319 00:17:00,300 --> 00:17:02,439 and of course, it's the shape, the curved shape 320 00:17:02,440 --> 00:17:04,659 of the wing that actually creates the lift. 321 00:17:04,660 --> 00:17:08,319 So by changing the lift characteristics of the airplane 322 00:17:08,320 --> 00:17:11,131 it makes it less able to fly. 323 00:17:11,132 --> 00:17:12,772 You know, I would have freaked out. 324 00:17:12,773 --> 00:17:14,809 If I'd have seen this much ice and thought 325 00:17:14,810 --> 00:17:18,183 oh my gosh, we were gonna crash. 326 00:17:20,230 --> 00:17:22,769 Observing that there was ice on the airplane 327 00:17:22,770 --> 00:17:25,859 was an important thing to do, but then it would be 328 00:17:25,860 --> 00:17:27,399 important to turn around and verify 329 00:17:27,400 --> 00:17:30,529 that your ant-icing, deicing equipment was on, 330 00:17:30,530 --> 00:17:32,859 and there was no indication on the voice recorder 331 00:17:32,860 --> 00:17:34,483 that they actually re-checked. 332 00:17:35,554 --> 00:17:37,699 The CVR reveals that only minutes 333 00:17:37,700 --> 00:17:39,819 after the crew detected ice, 334 00:17:39,820 --> 00:17:43,009 a device called the stick shaker went off. 335 00:17:43,010 --> 00:17:46,379 It was a warning that the plane was about to stall, 336 00:17:46,380 --> 00:17:48,363 literally to fall out of the sky. 337 00:17:51,220 --> 00:17:54,613 Shortly afterwards, the aircraft did precisely that. 338 00:18:00,400 --> 00:18:01,899 We know there were icing conditions. 339 00:18:01,900 --> 00:18:04,549 The only question was, were they bad enough 340 00:18:04,550 --> 00:18:06,923 to induce this airplane to have a failure? 341 00:18:07,930 --> 00:18:09,779 Ice is now the chief suspect 342 00:18:09,780 --> 00:18:12,423 in the crash of Flight 3407. 343 00:18:13,413 --> 00:18:15,313 If it's ice, let's prove it. 344 00:18:16,180 --> 00:18:19,279 We were all convinced that we had an icing accident. 345 00:18:19,280 --> 00:18:21,599 We said yeah, it's gonna be an icing accident. 346 00:18:21,600 --> 00:18:22,609 We just gotta make sure we look 347 00:18:22,610 --> 00:18:26,529 for these few key aspects of icing, verify that, 348 00:18:26,530 --> 00:18:28,049 and we're good. 349 00:18:28,050 --> 00:18:29,889 But some of the victims' family members 350 00:18:29,890 --> 00:18:31,879 are less convinced. 351 00:18:31,880 --> 00:18:34,489 My initial thought was that it was ice-related incident. 352 00:18:34,490 --> 00:18:37,609 It was a icy night that brought the plane down. 353 00:18:37,610 --> 00:18:40,789 And as we began to talk to people who knew airline travel 354 00:18:40,790 --> 00:18:43,349 who were pilots themselves, they would look 355 00:18:43,350 --> 00:18:45,629 kind of askant and say I don't think so. 356 00:18:45,630 --> 00:18:46,830 That doesn't make sense. 357 00:18:48,100 --> 00:18:51,129 Some investigators share that suspicion. 358 00:18:51,130 --> 00:18:53,826 Scott Warren knows a plane like the Q400 359 00:18:53,827 --> 00:18:56,313 has a sophisticated deicing system. 360 00:18:57,440 --> 00:18:59,539 It's designed to keep ice from building up 361 00:18:59,540 --> 00:19:02,240 on the wings and other critical parts of the aircraft. 362 00:19:05,470 --> 00:19:08,649 To prevent ice accumulating, the plane has rubber bladders 363 00:19:08,650 --> 00:19:11,803 along the front of the wings called deicing boots. 364 00:19:12,730 --> 00:19:15,309 A series of valves uses air from the engines 365 00:19:15,310 --> 00:19:18,373 to inflate the boots, and crack the ice off the wing. 366 00:19:19,260 --> 00:19:22,769 Those boots are designed to inflate periodically 367 00:19:22,770 --> 00:19:25,480 and that inflation breaks off the ice 368 00:19:26,720 --> 00:19:29,439 that's accumulated on those leading edges. 369 00:19:29,440 --> 00:19:32,839 Warren now wonders if the crew of Flight 3407 370 00:19:32,840 --> 00:19:35,443 actually turned on their deicing equipment. 371 00:19:37,100 --> 00:19:40,229 He studies data from the plane's other black box, 372 00:19:40,230 --> 00:19:42,743 its flight data recorder, or FDR. 373 00:19:43,710 --> 00:19:46,839 It tracks the workings of crucial aircraft systems, 374 00:19:46,840 --> 00:19:48,693 including the deicing mechanism. 375 00:19:50,950 --> 00:19:53,269 We know from the FDR data that the deicing system 376 00:19:53,270 --> 00:19:55,479 had been selected on by the crew, 377 00:19:55,480 --> 00:19:59,169 and it was on during the majority of the flight, 378 00:19:59,170 --> 00:20:00,759 and certainly at the end of the flight, 379 00:20:00,760 --> 00:20:04,019 it was recorded in the on position. 380 00:20:04,020 --> 00:20:05,859 But now Warren needs to figure out 381 00:20:05,860 --> 00:20:08,169 if the device was actually working. 382 00:20:08,170 --> 00:20:10,829 Just because the data records that the system is on, 383 00:20:10,830 --> 00:20:13,159 that's a start, but you can't necessarily 384 00:20:13,160 --> 00:20:15,799 believe that one piece of information. 385 00:20:15,800 --> 00:20:17,229 The only way to know 386 00:20:17,230 --> 00:20:20,469 is to find what remains of the plane's deicing system 387 00:20:20,470 --> 00:20:23,623 and determine if it was active when the aircraft went down. 388 00:20:25,700 --> 00:20:28,469 Clint Crookshanks' team hunts for a crucial component 389 00:20:28,470 --> 00:20:30,559 of the system, the valves. 390 00:20:30,560 --> 00:20:31,393 Excuse me. 391 00:20:32,904 --> 00:20:33,736 Okay. 392 00:20:33,737 --> 00:20:37,039 For the deice valves, we said here's what it looks like. 393 00:20:37,040 --> 00:20:38,649 Look for something like this. 394 00:20:38,650 --> 00:20:41,019 If we can find those valves, then we can test them 395 00:20:41,020 --> 00:20:42,970 and see if they're operating correctly. 396 00:20:43,900 --> 00:20:45,579 The valves were very important to us, 397 00:20:45,580 --> 00:20:49,179 because they are the key component that moves air 398 00:20:49,180 --> 00:20:51,849 from the engines where the bleed air originates 399 00:20:51,850 --> 00:20:53,013 for the deicing system. 400 00:21:07,696 --> 00:21:08,819 Okay, good. 401 00:21:08,820 --> 00:21:09,663 Five more to go. 402 00:21:19,530 --> 00:21:22,019 Five of the plane's six deicing valves 403 00:21:22,020 --> 00:21:23,403 are eventually recovered. 404 00:21:24,690 --> 00:21:25,819 Some were badly burned, 405 00:21:25,820 --> 00:21:27,499 some were in fairly good shape. 406 00:21:27,500 --> 00:21:30,239 And we took those valves, and we conducted 407 00:21:30,240 --> 00:21:31,439 as much testing on those valves 408 00:21:31,440 --> 00:21:34,479 as we thought was appropriate for the level of damage. 409 00:21:34,480 --> 00:21:37,959 We looked at the level of electrical conductivity, 410 00:21:37,960 --> 00:21:40,199 and we looked at the pressure testing. 411 00:21:40,200 --> 00:21:42,929 We looked at a wide variety of things 412 00:21:42,930 --> 00:21:45,280 depending on the condition of the valve itself. 413 00:21:46,810 --> 00:21:48,619 And as far as we could tell, all those valves 414 00:21:48,620 --> 00:21:49,720 were working properly. 415 00:21:51,037 --> 00:21:51,916 Is that ice on the windshield? 416 00:21:51,917 --> 00:21:53,519 Got it on my side. 417 00:21:53,520 --> 00:21:55,329 Now investigators have to consider 418 00:21:55,330 --> 00:21:57,579 the possibility-- - Oh yeah. 419 00:21:57,580 --> 00:21:58,412 Oh, it's lots of ice. 420 00:21:58,413 --> 00:22:00,859 That there was so much ice on the wings 421 00:22:00,860 --> 00:22:04,379 that the deicing system couldn't get rid of it fast enough. 422 00:22:04,380 --> 00:22:05,212 Oh yeah. 423 00:22:05,213 --> 00:22:06,769 That's the most I've seen on the leading edges 424 00:22:06,770 --> 00:22:07,633 in a long time. 425 00:22:09,970 --> 00:22:12,279 It has happened before. 426 00:22:12,280 --> 00:22:15,519 In Roselawn, Indiana, a French-built commuter plane 427 00:22:15,520 --> 00:22:19,779 crashed in 1994 after suffering a catastrophic buildup 428 00:22:19,780 --> 00:22:20,873 of ice on the wing. 429 00:22:29,230 --> 00:22:31,409 By analyzing how much power was needed 430 00:22:31,410 --> 00:22:33,749 for the plane to maintain its airspeed, 431 00:22:33,750 --> 00:22:36,343 investigators reach a surprising conclusion. 432 00:22:37,200 --> 00:22:39,959 Basically, the aircraft was flying as if it had 433 00:22:39,960 --> 00:22:42,299 a relatively small amount of ice on it, 434 00:22:42,300 --> 00:22:44,069 but a very manageable amount of ice. 435 00:22:44,070 --> 00:22:45,339 Looks normal. 436 00:22:45,340 --> 00:22:48,929 It was not overloaded, it was not excessive. 437 00:22:48,930 --> 00:22:50,949 If ice didn't bring down the plane, 438 00:22:50,950 --> 00:22:53,323 something else must have caused it to stall. 439 00:22:55,970 --> 00:22:58,909 Warren studies the Q400's operating manual 440 00:22:58,910 --> 00:23:00,969 to learn the plane's stall speed, 441 00:23:00,970 --> 00:23:03,069 the velocity at which it can no longer generate 442 00:23:03,070 --> 00:23:05,363 enough lift to stay in the air. 443 00:23:06,320 --> 00:23:09,509 He discovers that in the conditions Flight 3407 444 00:23:09,510 --> 00:23:13,003 was flying through, it's roughly 111 knots. 445 00:23:14,570 --> 00:23:16,499 He now compares the plane's stall speed 446 00:23:16,500 --> 00:23:18,649 with its actual airspeed just before 447 00:23:18,650 --> 00:23:20,123 the stall warning went off. 448 00:23:22,260 --> 00:23:26,273 131 knots, well above the danger zone. 449 00:23:28,420 --> 00:23:29,303 Flaps 15. 450 00:23:32,680 --> 00:23:34,882 When the stick shaker went off-- 451 00:23:34,883 --> 00:23:37,557 - Uh-- - Jesus Christ! 452 00:23:39,430 --> 00:23:43,203 They were not necessarily at the edge of a stall. 453 00:23:46,770 --> 00:23:50,749 They were still 20 knots or so away from the stall. 454 00:23:50,750 --> 00:23:53,309 This new revelation deepens the mystery 455 00:23:53,310 --> 00:23:55,569 of Flight 3407. 456 00:23:55,570 --> 00:23:59,330 If it wasn't stalling, why did it fall out of the sky? 457 00:24:02,930 --> 00:24:05,859 Investigators turn their attention to the critical seconds 458 00:24:05,860 --> 00:24:09,829 before Flight 3407 went out of control. 459 00:24:09,830 --> 00:24:11,489 They look for clues that could explain 460 00:24:11,490 --> 00:24:13,349 why the stall warning went off 461 00:24:13,350 --> 00:24:16,433 when the aircraft was flying well within its safety margins. 462 00:24:19,720 --> 00:24:22,139 They discover that this plane has a unique feature 463 00:24:22,140 --> 00:24:24,283 known as a reference speed switch. 464 00:24:25,310 --> 00:24:28,110 It governs the sensitivity of the plane's stall warning. 465 00:24:29,100 --> 00:24:31,189 Very few airplanes in my experience 466 00:24:31,190 --> 00:24:32,669 have such a switch. 467 00:24:32,670 --> 00:24:33,952 This airplane is the only one I know of 468 00:24:33,953 --> 00:24:37,749 that has an actual switch on the overhead panel. 469 00:24:37,750 --> 00:24:39,849 It was designed by the manufacturer 470 00:24:39,850 --> 00:24:41,899 to be an extra safety feature. 471 00:24:41,900 --> 00:24:44,189 So he had a variable ref speed? 472 00:24:44,190 --> 00:24:45,749 Pilots are supposed to turn on 473 00:24:45,750 --> 00:24:47,759 the reference speed switch when they're going to be 474 00:24:47,760 --> 00:24:50,139 flying through icing conditions. 475 00:24:50,140 --> 00:24:52,379 And we'll probably be picking up some ice. 476 00:24:52,380 --> 00:24:54,099 When in the increase position, 477 00:24:54,100 --> 00:24:56,409 it reminds pilots to fly faster 478 00:24:56,410 --> 00:24:58,959 to counteract any drag effect ice will have 479 00:24:58,960 --> 00:24:59,793 on the aircraft. 480 00:25:01,970 --> 00:25:03,949 When you are in icing conditions, 481 00:25:03,950 --> 00:25:05,679 and ice does accrue on the wing, 482 00:25:05,680 --> 00:25:09,409 it can cause the stall speed to go up, 483 00:25:09,410 --> 00:25:12,299 and so this ref speed switch correspondingly 484 00:25:12,300 --> 00:25:14,349 causes the warning to come on sooner, 485 00:25:14,350 --> 00:25:15,989 or at a higher speed. 486 00:25:15,990 --> 00:25:18,899 What that switch does is it basically 487 00:25:18,900 --> 00:25:21,479 changes the trigger settings for the stick shaker. 488 00:25:21,480 --> 00:25:23,059 So we had to ask the manufacturer, 489 00:25:23,060 --> 00:25:24,969 how does this switch work? 490 00:25:24,970 --> 00:25:28,689 What we found was it was part of a systems description 491 00:25:28,690 --> 00:25:31,149 that the crews got when they went through training, 492 00:25:31,150 --> 00:25:32,499 but they didn't get a lot of training 493 00:25:32,500 --> 00:25:33,969 on how to handle that switch. 494 00:25:33,970 --> 00:25:36,493 It seemed like it was too simple to worry about. 495 00:25:38,580 --> 00:25:40,149 Investigators need to know 496 00:25:40,150 --> 00:25:43,016 if the crew of Flight 3407 had turned on 497 00:25:43,017 --> 00:25:44,733 the reference speed switch, 498 00:25:45,810 --> 00:25:49,033 triggering the stick shaker at a faster than normal speed. 499 00:25:51,490 --> 00:25:53,519 The flight data recorder doesn't show 500 00:25:53,520 --> 00:25:55,159 whether the switch was on. 501 00:25:55,160 --> 00:25:57,669 Investigators must find another way of determining 502 00:25:57,670 --> 00:25:59,720 its position at the time of the accident. 503 00:26:08,440 --> 00:26:09,659 Clint here. 504 00:26:09,660 --> 00:26:12,175 Clint Crookshanks is given a new priority. 505 00:26:12,176 --> 00:26:13,529 All right, I'll see if we have it. 506 00:26:13,530 --> 00:26:15,369 Recover the ice protection panel 507 00:26:15,370 --> 00:26:17,559 from the Q400's cockpit, 508 00:26:17,560 --> 00:26:20,459 where the reference speed switch is housed. 509 00:26:20,460 --> 00:26:22,069 Since the panel was in the cockpit, 510 00:26:22,070 --> 00:26:23,603 finding it is a challenge. 511 00:26:25,930 --> 00:26:27,239 Most of the front end of the airplane 512 00:26:27,240 --> 00:26:29,909 was consumed by fire, and so we didn't find anything 513 00:26:29,910 --> 00:26:33,439 except for little balls of molten aluminum, 514 00:26:33,440 --> 00:26:36,589 little wire bundles, and a lot of ash. 515 00:26:36,590 --> 00:26:38,699 But after an extensive search, 516 00:26:38,700 --> 00:26:41,159 Crookshanks discovers that the ice protection panel 517 00:26:41,160 --> 00:26:44,053 is one of the few pieces of the cockpit that survived. 518 00:26:45,193 --> 00:26:46,719 Bingo. 519 00:26:46,720 --> 00:26:48,759 However, the knobs and switches 520 00:26:48,760 --> 00:26:50,103 are barely recognizable. 521 00:26:51,180 --> 00:26:53,129 Crookshanks examines the charred panel 522 00:26:53,130 --> 00:26:55,730 to check the position of the reference speed switch. 523 00:26:57,800 --> 00:27:00,099 It was set to activate stall warnings 524 00:27:00,100 --> 00:27:01,893 at higher than normal speeds. 525 00:27:04,160 --> 00:27:06,459 We did find the ref speed switch in the wreckage, 526 00:27:06,460 --> 00:27:08,260 and it was in the increase position. 527 00:27:09,930 --> 00:27:13,023 This discovery only raises more questions. 528 00:27:15,200 --> 00:27:16,589 We'll probably be picking up some ice. 529 00:27:16,590 --> 00:27:18,479 The cockpit voice recorder indicates 530 00:27:18,480 --> 00:27:22,089 that as Renslow was beginning his descent into Buffalo, 531 00:27:22,090 --> 00:27:26,589 he commanded his plane to fly at the normal approach speed. 532 00:27:26,590 --> 00:27:27,769 Left gear down. 533 00:27:27,770 --> 00:27:29,029 But what's strange 534 00:27:29,030 --> 00:27:32,159 is that with his reference speed switch on, 535 00:27:32,160 --> 00:27:34,460 he actually should have been flying faster. 536 00:27:36,063 --> 00:27:36,895 Bless you. 537 00:27:36,896 --> 00:27:37,728 As this is what the switch 538 00:27:37,729 --> 00:27:38,613 would remind him to do. 539 00:27:40,100 --> 00:27:42,129 So why wasn't he? 540 00:27:42,130 --> 00:27:45,569 The plane's computer warned the crew to fly faster, 541 00:27:45,570 --> 00:27:48,069 according to the settings they had configured, 542 00:27:48,070 --> 00:27:51,086 by displaying a set of red bars on the airspeed indicator. 543 00:27:51,087 --> 00:27:52,599 But you may have a better quality of life 544 00:27:52,600 --> 00:27:53,432 in regards to-- 545 00:27:53,433 --> 00:27:55,249 These bars are meant to warn the pilots 546 00:27:55,250 --> 00:27:57,400 that a stick shaker activation is imminent. 547 00:27:58,260 --> 00:27:59,999 If you're looking at the airspeed indicator, 548 00:28:00,000 --> 00:28:02,859 you should be aware that you're getting slow, 549 00:28:02,860 --> 00:28:04,883 and the stall warning may come on. 550 00:28:06,750 --> 00:28:07,899 Jesus Christ! 551 00:28:07,900 --> 00:28:09,529 It seems Renslow and Shaw 552 00:28:09,530 --> 00:28:11,449 were caught off guard. 553 00:28:11,450 --> 00:28:14,293 Still, they could have easily corrected the situation. 554 00:28:15,460 --> 00:28:18,999 Once the stick shaker have activated, they could have 555 00:28:19,000 --> 00:28:20,609 turned the switch off, 556 00:28:20,610 --> 00:28:22,699 or they could have put the nose down 557 00:28:22,700 --> 00:28:24,289 and increased their airspeed. 558 00:28:24,290 --> 00:28:25,719 It's clear to investigators 559 00:28:25,720 --> 00:28:29,129 that Flight 3407 wasn't in danger of stalling 560 00:28:29,130 --> 00:28:30,723 when the stick shaker went off. 561 00:28:31,600 --> 00:28:33,819 So now they need to know exactly what happened 562 00:28:33,820 --> 00:28:35,813 after the stall warning was activated. 563 00:28:37,640 --> 00:28:40,370 An animated simulation of the crash is constructed 564 00:28:41,330 --> 00:28:43,680 based on information from the flight recorders. 565 00:28:44,730 --> 00:28:47,673 Watch what happens just after the stick shaker goes off. 566 00:28:48,790 --> 00:28:51,099 It illustrates that just after the stick shaker 567 00:28:51,100 --> 00:28:54,659 was triggered, the plane suddenly pulled up. 568 00:28:54,660 --> 00:28:57,799 This action dramatically slowed the aircraft, 569 00:28:57,800 --> 00:29:00,229 and at this point, it did stall. 570 00:29:00,230 --> 00:29:03,099 Essentially, the airplane entered an aerodynamic stall 571 00:29:03,100 --> 00:29:05,049 from which it did not recover. 572 00:29:05,050 --> 00:29:06,629 It pitched over, and hit the ground. 573 00:29:06,630 --> 00:29:08,749 Investigators are dumbfounded. 574 00:29:08,750 --> 00:29:13,689 Flight 3407 wasn't stalling when the stick shaker went off, 575 00:29:13,690 --> 00:29:15,653 but a few seconds later, it was. 576 00:29:17,290 --> 00:29:19,919 The crew's every action during that brief time 577 00:29:19,920 --> 00:29:21,773 now demands careful scrutiny. 578 00:29:23,060 --> 00:29:24,173 What did they do? 579 00:29:25,750 --> 00:29:27,169 It's a puzzle. 580 00:29:27,170 --> 00:29:29,569 How could a trained flight crew take a plane 581 00:29:29,570 --> 00:29:32,969 that wasn't stalling, and in the space of a few moments 582 00:29:32,970 --> 00:29:35,159 make it fall from the sky? 583 00:29:35,160 --> 00:29:37,289 Any time you have an apparent stall 584 00:29:37,290 --> 00:29:39,399 for no apparent reason, that's a mystery. 585 00:29:39,400 --> 00:29:44,400 We would expect that no flight crew would stall an airliner. 586 00:29:44,820 --> 00:29:46,113 So the question is why. 587 00:29:47,430 --> 00:29:49,909 The focus of the investigation now switches 588 00:29:49,910 --> 00:29:52,579 from the plane to the crew, 589 00:29:52,580 --> 00:29:54,769 specifically on the moves they made 590 00:29:54,770 --> 00:29:57,813 during the critical seconds after the stall warning sounded. 591 00:29:58,980 --> 00:30:02,009 We wanted to see if the way they flew the airplane 592 00:30:02,010 --> 00:30:03,839 was the way they were trained 593 00:30:03,840 --> 00:30:05,829 according to the standard operating procedures 594 00:30:05,830 --> 00:30:08,163 that are portrayed in our flight manuals. 595 00:30:09,640 --> 00:30:12,059 The flight data recorder retains information 596 00:30:12,060 --> 00:30:14,449 from more than 1000 different aspects 597 00:30:14,450 --> 00:30:16,653 of the Q400's flight operations. 598 00:30:18,650 --> 00:30:21,049 From the airspeed and altitude, 599 00:30:21,050 --> 00:30:23,600 to the position of the rudder pedals and throttles. 600 00:30:24,660 --> 00:30:26,309 It also records the movements 601 00:30:26,310 --> 00:30:28,839 of the most critical flight control, 602 00:30:28,840 --> 00:30:30,063 the control column. 603 00:30:31,290 --> 00:30:34,019 Pilots use the control column to change the position 604 00:30:34,020 --> 00:30:35,543 of the elevators and ailerons, 605 00:30:36,560 --> 00:30:38,560 which manage the direction of the plane. 606 00:30:40,140 --> 00:30:42,439 The flight data recorder stores information 607 00:30:42,440 --> 00:30:45,469 not just about the control column's position, 608 00:30:45,470 --> 00:30:47,713 but how much force is applied to it as well. 609 00:30:49,353 --> 00:30:52,709 The FDR records what the control positions were. 610 00:30:52,710 --> 00:30:54,759 It has sensors built into the control column, 611 00:30:54,760 --> 00:30:57,499 it has sensors built into the control wheel. 612 00:30:57,500 --> 00:30:59,009 What Scott Warren finds 613 00:30:59,010 --> 00:31:03,329 when analyzing the control column's position is stunning. 614 00:31:03,330 --> 00:31:05,869 In response to the stick shaker, Captain Renslow 615 00:31:05,870 --> 00:31:07,769 should have pushed the column forward 616 00:31:07,770 --> 00:31:10,013 to bring the nose down and gain speed. 617 00:31:10,970 --> 00:31:13,833 But for some reason, he did the exact opposite. 618 00:31:14,760 --> 00:31:17,099 We found that the crew, instead of pushing forward, 619 00:31:17,100 --> 00:31:20,569 which is the normal response to a stick shaker triggering, 620 00:31:20,570 --> 00:31:23,969 the crew was actually pulling back on the control. 621 00:31:23,970 --> 00:31:26,589 This had the effect of pulling the nose up, 622 00:31:26,590 --> 00:31:29,799 causing the airspeed to drop, and tipping the aircraft 623 00:31:29,800 --> 00:31:31,778 into an actual stall. 624 00:31:34,090 --> 00:31:36,359 Captain Renslow had apparently mishandled 625 00:31:36,360 --> 00:31:38,963 one of the most elemental piloting maneuvers, 626 00:31:40,000 --> 00:31:41,593 how to recover from a stall. 627 00:31:42,850 --> 00:31:45,429 Above everything, it requires gaining airspeed 628 00:31:45,430 --> 00:31:46,583 to get out of the red. 629 00:31:48,640 --> 00:31:50,139 The recovery procedure 630 00:31:50,140 --> 00:31:52,929 is fairly simple and straightforward. 631 00:31:52,930 --> 00:31:55,119 It requires pushing forward on the controls, 632 00:31:55,120 --> 00:31:56,423 and adding full power. 633 00:31:57,730 --> 00:32:01,179 At any point in time, had the captain pushed forward 634 00:32:01,180 --> 00:32:04,849 on those flight controls, he had a reasonably good chance 635 00:32:04,850 --> 00:32:06,133 at recovering quickly. 636 00:32:08,270 --> 00:32:09,919 From everything we've gained, 637 00:32:09,920 --> 00:32:12,849 that stall was recoverable on a repeated number of levels, 638 00:32:12,850 --> 00:32:13,682 and a repeated basis. 639 00:32:13,683 --> 00:32:15,709 There was no reason for that plane to go down. 640 00:32:15,710 --> 00:32:17,119 Investigators also learn 641 00:32:17,120 --> 00:32:19,899 that first officer Shaw, in trying to help Renslow 642 00:32:19,900 --> 00:32:23,203 deal with the crisis, inadvertently made things worse. 643 00:32:24,703 --> 00:32:26,409 I put the flaps up! 644 00:32:26,410 --> 00:32:29,379 She retracted the flaps, reducing the amount 645 00:32:29,380 --> 00:32:32,053 of lift as the plane struggled to stay in the air. 646 00:32:33,460 --> 00:32:36,639 Had the first officer simply called out you're stalled, 647 00:32:36,640 --> 00:32:39,319 advanced the power, pushed the nose over, 648 00:32:39,320 --> 00:32:41,769 the airplane would have been able to recover. 649 00:32:41,770 --> 00:32:44,029 From a human point of view, it's sad to recognize 650 00:32:44,030 --> 00:32:46,189 that those sorts of things happened, 651 00:32:46,190 --> 00:32:48,053 and the tragedy that came from that. 652 00:32:49,000 --> 00:32:51,499 It's concluded that Captain Renslow's failure 653 00:32:51,500 --> 00:32:54,109 to properly respond to the stall warning 654 00:32:54,110 --> 00:32:58,399 was the primary cause of the crash of Flight 3407. 655 00:32:58,400 --> 00:33:00,299 As the issue is now pilot error, 656 00:33:00,300 --> 00:33:02,669 rather than mechanical failure, 657 00:33:02,670 --> 00:33:04,359 human performance investigator 658 00:33:04,360 --> 00:33:06,213 Evan Byrne is brought onboard. 659 00:33:07,330 --> 00:33:11,079 His first question, why hadn't either Renslow or Shaw 660 00:33:11,080 --> 00:33:13,219 noticed that their airspeed was too low 661 00:33:13,220 --> 00:33:14,603 for the icing conditions? 662 00:33:16,590 --> 00:33:20,149 In this case, we can look back towards the fact 663 00:33:20,150 --> 00:33:22,249 that there were clear and conspicuous cues 664 00:33:22,250 --> 00:33:25,259 of the deteriorating airspeed that were not heeded 665 00:33:25,260 --> 00:33:26,283 by the captain. 666 00:33:27,260 --> 00:33:29,549 Byrne listens to the cockpit voice recording 667 00:33:29,550 --> 00:33:33,194 to try to understand what might have led to that oversight. 668 00:33:33,195 --> 00:33:35,299 Where you could be home with your husband, 669 00:33:35,300 --> 00:33:37,579 to take care of, and all that stuff. 670 00:33:37,580 --> 00:33:39,489 He learns that the crew had been talking 671 00:33:39,490 --> 00:33:41,229 throughout the flight. 672 00:33:41,230 --> 00:33:44,769 The conversation continued during the landing approach. 673 00:33:44,770 --> 00:33:48,143 It's a violation of a rule known as the sterile cockpit, 674 00:33:48,990 --> 00:33:51,089 which bans nonessential conversation 675 00:33:51,090 --> 00:33:52,939 during critical phases of the flight. 676 00:33:52,940 --> 00:33:55,497 Yeah, you're gonna be upgraded in six months. 677 00:33:55,498 --> 00:33:57,134 Blah, blah, blah. 678 00:33:58,040 --> 00:34:00,609 Quite simply, it prohibits conversations 679 00:34:00,610 --> 00:34:02,989 that aren't related to the operation of the flight. 680 00:34:02,990 --> 00:34:05,049 Let's do a descent checklist, please. 681 00:34:05,050 --> 00:34:07,646 We can do the approach checklist along with it. 682 00:34:07,647 --> 00:34:08,730 Yeah, sure. 683 00:34:09,567 --> 00:34:10,399 Bug set. 684 00:34:10,400 --> 00:34:11,329 Byrne also discovers 685 00:34:11,330 --> 00:34:13,589 that because of the cockpit banter, 686 00:34:13,590 --> 00:34:16,823 the crew performed critical checklists and briefings late. 687 00:34:18,880 --> 00:34:21,059 The hydraulic pressure and quantity-- 688 00:34:21,060 --> 00:34:23,499 Distracted, the crew probably didn't see 689 00:34:23,500 --> 00:34:26,419 the red bar indicating they were flying too slowly 690 00:34:26,420 --> 00:34:29,070 for the conditions the plane had been configured for. 691 00:34:30,450 --> 00:34:32,779 Approach checklist complete. 692 00:34:32,780 --> 00:34:33,612 Rock and roll. 693 00:34:33,613 --> 00:34:36,119 When crews deviate from standard operating procedures, 694 00:34:36,120 --> 00:34:38,369 and perform checklists late, or don't make 695 00:34:38,370 --> 00:34:40,959 the required call outs, they become more vulnerable 696 00:34:40,960 --> 00:34:44,829 to subtle mistakes that they may make inadvertently 697 00:34:44,830 --> 00:34:48,149 that could lead to startle and surprise, 698 00:34:48,150 --> 00:34:51,239 or unanticipated events that they have to respond to. 699 00:34:51,240 --> 00:34:53,389 The evidence is unequivocal. 700 00:34:53,390 --> 00:34:56,979 The crew of Flight 3407 was badly distracted 701 00:34:56,980 --> 00:34:58,509 throughout the approach. 702 00:34:58,510 --> 00:35:00,519 Even when we interviewed, and he said yeah, 703 00:35:00,520 --> 00:35:02,609 you're gonna be upgraded in six months. 704 00:35:02,610 --> 00:35:04,369 They had forgotten the key setting 705 00:35:04,370 --> 00:35:07,483 they had made that required them to fly faster than normal. 706 00:35:08,990 --> 00:35:11,079 They had missed indications that they were flying 707 00:35:11,080 --> 00:35:13,293 too slow for icing conditions. 708 00:35:14,360 --> 00:35:16,909 Then, Captain Renslow had reacted incorrectly 709 00:35:16,910 --> 00:35:20,293 to a stall warning, sealing the fate of the plane. 710 00:35:25,060 --> 00:35:27,749 Evan Byrne wonders what could have caused 711 00:35:27,750 --> 00:35:29,319 a trained airline flight crew 712 00:35:29,320 --> 00:35:31,293 to have made such missteps? 713 00:35:32,200 --> 00:35:35,243 He finds a clue on the cockpit voice recording. 714 00:35:37,720 --> 00:35:38,770 Excuse me. 715 00:35:43,550 --> 00:35:46,149 The crew was showing signs of fatigue. 716 00:35:46,150 --> 00:35:48,729 Could Renslow and Shaw have been too tired 717 00:35:48,730 --> 00:35:51,709 to function effectively on the flight deck? 718 00:35:51,710 --> 00:35:53,309 It's a tough question. 719 00:35:53,310 --> 00:35:55,779 Answering it will require tracking their movements 720 00:35:55,780 --> 00:35:58,889 during the 72 hours leading up to the crash. 721 00:35:58,890 --> 00:36:00,739 It's basic gumshoe detective work 722 00:36:00,740 --> 00:36:03,249 in the investigation where we're trying to collect 723 00:36:03,250 --> 00:36:04,859 as many facts as we can. 724 00:36:04,860 --> 00:36:07,169 Byrne interviews the families of the pilots. 725 00:36:07,170 --> 00:36:09,070 Can I speak to Mrs. Renslow, please? 726 00:36:11,320 --> 00:36:13,689 He studies the pilots' mobile phone bills, 727 00:36:13,690 --> 00:36:15,463 and records of text messages. 728 00:36:17,800 --> 00:36:20,409 He searches the airline's computer system 729 00:36:20,410 --> 00:36:22,669 to determine if and when the crew used it 730 00:36:22,670 --> 00:36:24,559 to check their schedules. 731 00:36:24,560 --> 00:36:26,673 He needs to track their every move. 732 00:36:27,883 --> 00:36:29,409 And what time did Rebecca leave the house? 733 00:36:29,410 --> 00:36:32,529 We're talking to colleagues or other pilots, 734 00:36:32,530 --> 00:36:37,219 check airmen, instructors, and we ask all those people 735 00:36:37,220 --> 00:36:40,369 about the pilots, about their recent activities. 736 00:36:40,370 --> 00:36:41,999 He learns that neither pilot 737 00:36:42,000 --> 00:36:43,983 actually lived anywhere near Newark, 738 00:36:45,280 --> 00:36:47,319 but could not afford to stay in hotels 739 00:36:47,320 --> 00:36:49,169 on their salaries. 740 00:36:49,170 --> 00:36:52,129 Captain Renslow was earning $60,000 annually 741 00:36:52,130 --> 00:36:53,083 at Colgan Air. 742 00:36:54,440 --> 00:36:58,579 First officer Shaw was being paid less than $16,000 a year, 743 00:36:58,580 --> 00:37:01,869 substantially less than an average bus driver. 744 00:37:01,870 --> 00:37:04,019 As a result, both pilots had made 745 00:37:04,020 --> 00:37:06,649 long cross-country commutes to Newark, 746 00:37:06,650 --> 00:37:09,419 Captain Renslow from his home in Florida, 747 00:37:09,420 --> 00:37:11,713 and Rebecca Shaw from Seattle, Washington. 748 00:37:14,540 --> 00:37:17,249 In fact, Shaw had commuted all night from Seattle 749 00:37:17,250 --> 00:37:20,093 on a cargo flight that connected through Memphis. 750 00:37:23,480 --> 00:37:25,289 Captain Renslow had spent the night 751 00:37:25,290 --> 00:37:27,870 in the airline's crew lounge at Newark airport 752 00:37:28,850 --> 00:37:31,253 after having already worked two days. 753 00:37:34,480 --> 00:37:37,033 He was seen sleeping on a couch in the lounge. 754 00:37:39,090 --> 00:37:41,839 It was against company rules, but pilots who couldn't 755 00:37:41,840 --> 00:37:44,393 afford housing near the airport did it anyway. 756 00:37:45,820 --> 00:37:49,389 Records show that at 3:10 a.m. on the morning of the crash, 757 00:37:49,390 --> 00:37:51,339 Renslow was awake. 758 00:37:51,340 --> 00:37:52,669 He checked his work schedule 759 00:37:52,670 --> 00:37:54,433 on the airline's computer network. 760 00:38:03,150 --> 00:38:04,223 Next stop, Buffalo. 761 00:38:06,320 --> 00:38:10,099 At 7:29 a.m., Rebecca Shaw sent a text message 762 00:38:10,100 --> 00:38:13,533 to her husband telling him she'd arrived safely in Newark. 763 00:38:16,320 --> 00:38:17,999 Hi honey, it's me. 764 00:38:18,000 --> 00:38:19,189 Phone records indicate 765 00:38:19,190 --> 00:38:20,979 that later in the morning, Captain Renslow 766 00:38:20,980 --> 00:38:22,823 was on the phone several times. 767 00:38:24,830 --> 00:38:27,539 Rebecca Shaw was noticed having a nap 768 00:38:27,540 --> 00:38:29,979 catching up on the rest she'd lost flying in 769 00:38:29,980 --> 00:38:31,053 the night before. 770 00:38:34,610 --> 00:38:36,010 That's not a lot of sleep. 771 00:38:38,810 --> 00:38:40,959 We ultimately concluded that it was likely 772 00:38:40,960 --> 00:38:43,539 that both crew members were experiencing some effects 773 00:38:43,540 --> 00:38:45,979 of fatigue at the time of the accident. 774 00:38:45,980 --> 00:38:47,730 Her job is to watch the airspeed. 775 00:38:48,830 --> 00:38:50,499 Her job was to watch the instrument panel, 776 00:38:50,500 --> 00:38:53,359 and in my view, if she was fatigued to the point 777 00:38:53,360 --> 00:38:55,889 where it's like right here, and you're so dull, 778 00:38:55,890 --> 00:38:56,722 I think that's where she was, 779 00:38:56,723 --> 00:38:58,429 and he just was not capable. 780 00:38:58,430 --> 00:39:01,653 He was just, he shouldn't have been flying an airplane. 781 00:39:03,500 --> 00:39:05,729 The revelation leads John Kausner 782 00:39:05,730 --> 00:39:08,893 to become a fierce advocate for changes to the industry. 783 00:39:09,970 --> 00:39:13,649 He raises awareness among both lawmakers and the public 784 00:39:13,650 --> 00:39:15,799 about the need to improve regulations 785 00:39:15,800 --> 00:39:18,053 governing pilots at regional airlines. 786 00:39:19,310 --> 00:39:21,619 This is just saying we support 3407 families 787 00:39:21,620 --> 00:39:23,479 that are fighting for aviation safety, 788 00:39:23,480 --> 00:39:25,159 and these representatives of congressmen and senators 789 00:39:25,160 --> 00:39:27,929 have done that for us, and we're very appreciative. 790 00:39:27,930 --> 00:39:29,609 He takes his fight all the way 791 00:39:29,610 --> 00:39:31,223 to Washington, DC. 792 00:39:32,130 --> 00:39:34,949 We needed to do something, and so we began to advocate 793 00:39:34,950 --> 00:39:37,969 in Washington weekly, every other week, 794 00:39:37,970 --> 00:39:40,079 and we've innumerable trips down there. 795 00:39:40,080 --> 00:39:42,499 And immediately, the families just gelled. 796 00:39:42,500 --> 00:39:44,088 We all attended the hearings 797 00:39:44,089 --> 00:39:47,223 and began to say this is what we can do. 798 00:39:48,190 --> 00:39:50,759 The crash of Flight 3407 799 00:39:50,760 --> 00:39:53,833 focused the world's attention on a growing safety problem. 800 00:39:55,610 --> 00:39:57,799 The relatives of those who were killed 801 00:39:57,800 --> 00:39:59,663 will help eliminate that threat. 802 00:40:04,250 --> 00:40:08,649 The crash of Flight 3407 exposed wide-ranging shortcomings 803 00:40:08,650 --> 00:40:12,059 into regulations that govern regional airlines. 804 00:40:12,060 --> 00:40:14,419 These smaller airlines now make up half 805 00:40:14,420 --> 00:40:17,679 of all daily passenger flights in the US. 806 00:40:17,680 --> 00:40:21,129 Their pilots are generally younger, less experienced, 807 00:40:21,130 --> 00:40:23,283 earn less, and work long hours. 808 00:40:24,630 --> 00:40:27,339 Their levels of safety are way different 809 00:40:27,340 --> 00:40:28,172 from the majors. 810 00:40:28,173 --> 00:40:31,993 They have a much lower threshold, in training, in ability. 811 00:40:33,870 --> 00:40:35,729 In pay, obviously, so they can't attract 812 00:40:35,730 --> 00:40:37,159 a higher qualified pilot. 813 00:40:37,160 --> 00:40:39,469 There are pretty low wages, 814 00:40:39,470 --> 00:40:41,270 pretty difficult working conditions. 815 00:40:42,470 --> 00:40:45,599 We don't seem to attract the same level 816 00:40:45,600 --> 00:40:48,309 of applicant that we used to. 817 00:40:48,310 --> 00:40:51,299 Some regional airlines get into a bind, 818 00:40:51,300 --> 00:40:53,619 and they have to hire the first people 819 00:40:53,620 --> 00:40:54,903 that meet the minimums. 820 00:40:56,360 --> 00:40:59,249 In the US, of the seven fatal accidents 821 00:40:59,250 --> 00:41:02,049 involving passenger jets over the past 10 years, 822 00:41:02,050 --> 00:41:04,683 five have involved regional airlines. 823 00:41:08,290 --> 00:41:11,909 Those include the crash of Delta Connection Flight 5191 824 00:41:11,910 --> 00:41:15,579 in August 2006, which killed 49 people 825 00:41:15,580 --> 00:41:18,013 when the crew took off from the wrong runway. 826 00:41:23,500 --> 00:41:26,759 John Kausner's campaign to change laws governing pilots 827 00:41:26,760 --> 00:41:28,489 has paid off. 828 00:41:28,490 --> 00:41:31,059 We relied on your support, we needed your support, 829 00:41:31,060 --> 00:41:32,159 you nurtured us. 830 00:41:32,160 --> 00:41:34,749 We wanna thank all of you, from all of us. 831 00:41:34,750 --> 00:41:37,399 A year and a half after the crash, 832 00:41:37,400 --> 00:41:38,809 under pressure from Kausner 833 00:41:38,810 --> 00:41:41,499 and other victims' family members, 834 00:41:41,500 --> 00:41:43,149 the US Senate passed a bill 835 00:41:43,150 --> 00:41:45,699 which toughens training requirements, 836 00:41:45,700 --> 00:41:48,409 and forces the FAA to draw up new rules 837 00:41:48,410 --> 00:41:49,593 on pilot fatigue. 838 00:41:52,970 --> 00:41:55,529 Studies into the problem of over-tired pilots 839 00:41:55,530 --> 00:41:56,853 are already underway. 840 00:42:00,320 --> 00:42:03,299 At the University of Iowa, researchers are developing 841 00:42:03,300 --> 00:42:06,053 a system that could help pilots resist fatigue, 842 00:42:07,440 --> 00:42:10,609 stay engaged with the critical task of flying, 843 00:42:10,610 --> 00:42:14,583 and prevent future tragedies like that of Flight 3407. 844 00:42:17,370 --> 00:42:20,363 Thomas Schnell is a human factors engineer. 845 00:42:21,850 --> 00:42:26,069 We use a number of neurocognitive and physiological 846 00:42:26,070 --> 00:42:30,819 sensors that we apply on subjects, pilots that we invite 847 00:42:30,820 --> 00:42:31,653 for our studies. 848 00:42:36,185 --> 00:42:37,017 Well, just go ahead. 849 00:42:37,018 --> 00:42:39,029 He's studying how pilots stay alert 850 00:42:39,030 --> 00:42:41,449 on the flight deck as a test subject conducts 851 00:42:41,450 --> 00:42:43,979 a cross-country journey in a simulator. 852 00:42:43,980 --> 00:42:47,179 Using sensors, he can determine how alert and engaged 853 00:42:47,180 --> 00:42:49,029 a pilot really is. 854 00:42:49,030 --> 00:42:50,899 The research could lead to the development 855 00:42:50,900 --> 00:42:52,953 of fatigue detectors on airplanes. 856 00:42:54,090 --> 00:42:57,469 We are trying to predict pilot state 857 00:42:57,470 --> 00:43:00,409 so that we can adjust something on the flight deck 858 00:43:00,410 --> 00:43:03,149 to prevent the problem from getting worse, 859 00:43:03,150 --> 00:43:05,379 or starting in the first place. 860 00:43:05,380 --> 00:43:09,819 We monitor brain activity, eye movement activity, 861 00:43:09,820 --> 00:43:14,399 heart, the EKG and respiration, and other parameters, 862 00:43:14,400 --> 00:43:17,269 in an effort to figure out what the pilots 863 00:43:17,270 --> 00:43:19,119 or the crew's state is. 864 00:43:19,120 --> 00:43:21,599 Are they fatigued, overworked, 865 00:43:21,600 --> 00:43:23,763 are they disengaged or distracted? 866 00:43:27,320 --> 00:43:30,009 This section is where they were really drowsy, 867 00:43:30,010 --> 00:43:33,323 and you can see that the gaze has become kind of bored. 868 00:43:37,890 --> 00:43:39,829 Schnell instructs the flight simulator 869 00:43:39,830 --> 00:43:42,996 to trigger a major systems failure in the cockpit. 870 00:43:46,582 --> 00:43:47,414 It's no good. 871 00:43:47,415 --> 00:43:48,649 Everything's dead. 872 00:43:48,650 --> 00:43:50,200 Hydraulics systems have failed. 873 00:43:52,910 --> 00:43:54,869 Try and call that heat map so we can see 874 00:43:54,870 --> 00:43:56,563 what this brain activity was. 875 00:43:58,040 --> 00:43:59,488 Brace for effect. 876 00:44:01,220 --> 00:44:03,859 When a crew is fatigued, what you might see 877 00:44:03,860 --> 00:44:06,659 is that their reaction to events might slow down, 878 00:44:06,660 --> 00:44:10,323 so you'll see mistakes being made on the flight deck. 879 00:44:11,760 --> 00:44:14,049 It's precisely these kinds of mistakes 880 00:44:14,050 --> 00:44:15,860 on the part of Renslow and Shaw 881 00:44:17,690 --> 00:44:20,883 that ultimately crashed Flight 3407. 882 00:44:23,920 --> 00:44:25,653 And killed 50 people. 883 00:44:30,070 --> 00:44:32,239 It's a tragedy that should not have happened. 884 00:44:32,240 --> 00:44:34,499 It was foreseeable, was preventable, 885 00:44:34,500 --> 00:44:37,199 and it's repeatable if we don't do something about it. 886 00:44:37,200 --> 00:44:39,769 And I'm focused and determined to change what exists 887 00:44:39,770 --> 00:44:41,623 and not have another dad sitting here.